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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY J. WITHERSPOON, .' , ' : 
Plaintiff-Respondent# i 
Case No. 14285 
vs. : 
WALTER T. STEWART, et a] ., , : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
:
 ' • STATEMENT OF THE NATURE uF THh CASK 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Gary J. Witherspoon, sued Defendant-
Appellant, Walter T. Stewart, asking fnr a Writ* of Replevin 
for the return of JS head of cattle purchased by the Defendant-
Appellant through mesne conveyances from Plaintiff claiming 
t:i tl e I: lad i lot passed fr oirt 1 :i :i m ai id 1 :c 1 la < e ai l amoi n i1 :» I: $ ] 500 00 
paid by oi le of the mesne purchasers to the Plaintiff be de- -
Glared liquidated damages to the Plaintiff. 
The <(»theJ: named Defendants were i lot ser \ red. • • ^ ' 
• • Pending trial the cattle were sold and the proceeds 
applied to the benefit of Plaintiff, Defendant-Appellant 
Stewart amended his pleadings by leave .; \-:,l 
asking for judgment against Plaintiff-Respondent, Gary J. 
WitlierspocH" III I IK .mumim il M| YBSUU 1)11 u'\ 
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paid for the cattle. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
" The matter was tried on the issue of whether Defendant 
was entitled to the $8500.00 paid by him for the cattle. 
The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, 
Gary J. Witherspoon, and against Defendant Stewart — the 
trial court ruling that the pertinent bills of sale did not 
meet the requirements of the Utah Livestock Brank and Anti-
Theft Act. -."'* '^*.^.:.^;-: ' 'M- :.;...-: ;:;eck; - , • :•; w^ .'.' 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, Walter T. Stewart, seeks reversal 
of the trial Court's ruling and prays judgment against 
Plaintiff-Respondent in the amount of $8500.00. 
">••% STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a professor of Anthropology at Weber State 
College and part-time farmer, owned the cattle which are the 
subject matter of this action. The cattle bore the brand of 
Plaintiff which had been duly registered. The cattle were 
kept in two separate corrals — one in Juab County and one 
in Sanpete County. 
Sometime in February, 1974, Jerry Yeck gave Plaintiff, 
Gary Witherspoon, $1500.00 as an earnest money deposit on 
the purchase of 35 head of cattle. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
last page) 
On Monday, February 17, 1974, Jerry Yeck, for Deseret 
- 2 -
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Distributing Company, purchased from Plaintiff, Gary Wither-
spoon, 35 head of yearlings and calves giving two checks as 
payment, one for $815.00 and another for $11,450.00, each 
dated February 20, 1974. Witherspoon gave Deseret Distri-
buting Company a bill of sale in his own handwriting granting 
Deseret full ownership and possession of the cattle. This 
transaction took place at Ogden, Utah. (Pg. 1 of Plfs. Exh. 1) 
Pursuant to a bill of sale dated February 19f 1974, 
Yeck, for Deseret Distributing Company, sold the subject 
cattle to American Federal Corporation. Yeck displayed to 
American Federal the Witherspoon bill of sale, and took rep-
resentatives of American Federal to a corral in Mills, Utah 
County, and another in Fayette, Utah, where the cattle were 
located. 
On Thursday, February 21, 1974, Defendant-Appellant, 
Walter T. Stewart, was contacted by American Federal to sell 
the cattle to him. Stewart visited both sites and looked at 
the cattle. Mr. Seth McPherson, acting as custodian of the 
cattle, showed the cattle, where to load them, and how to get 
trucks in to the loading area. On February 21, 1974, Stewart 
gave American Federal a cashier's check in the amount of 
$8500.00 for the 35 head of cattle ($8500.00 being the market 
price of said cattle as of that date as stipulated to by 
counsel at trial), and received a bill of sale. (Def.fs Exh. 6) 
Two days later, February, 23, Stewart rented two trucks 
- 3 -
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and hired one driver and proceeded to Mills, Utah, to pick 
up the 20 head of cattle in that corral. The custodian of 
the cattle, Seth McPherson, initially directed the loading 
of the cattle; helped load the first truck with seven head, 
but subsequently reported that "a lady over there says there 
is something wrong with the title to those cattle." He, 
thereupon, did not help further loading but let Stewart and 
his man load the rest. 
In the meantime, the two checks given in the total 
amount of $12,335.00 by Yeck to Witherspoon had been dis-
honored by the bank, leaving only the $1500.00 payment to 
Witherspoon. Witherspoon contacted certain law agencies to 
report this. , 
Subsequently, the Highway Patrol stopped the two trucks 
Stewart had rented while the cattle were being transported. 
The cattle were impounded and later sold. The monies were 
credited to Plaintiff pending trial. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE PERTINENT BILLS OF SALE WERE VOID. 
The trial court held that the pertinent bills of sale 
did not meet the requirements of the Utah Livestock Brank 
and Anti-Theft Act, Section 4-13-17, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) (R. 72), and that therefore title to the 35 head of 
cattle never passed from Witherspoon (R. 96). In ruling the 
• - 4 - "-
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transfers void, the Court held that: 
The Anti-Theft and Branding statute is designed 
to protect not only the owners of livestock but 
those who would purchase livestock to insure that 
good title might be conveyed. The statute was de-
signed for the protection of Walter Stewart and he 
did not comply with the statute and therefore can-
not claim ownership to the cattle. The mandate of 
the statute is clear. A transfer of title is valid 
only if effected in conformity with Section 4-13-17, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Pugh v. Stratton, 22 
Utah 2d 190, 450 P. 2d 463, (1969). (R.96) 
Utah law is contrary. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Burrows, 27 
Utah 2d 436, 497 P. 2d 240 (1972), that a bill of sale that 
does not meet all of the requirements of the Utah Livestock 
Brand and Anti-Theft Act is not necessarily void. 
In Wilson v. Burrows there had been no attempt by the 
parties to comply with the Anti-Theft Act requirements re-
garding bills of sale. There was a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
which provided: 
The Seller agrees to release all cattle to the 
buyer so that he may put them under loan in his 
name. 27 Utah 2d at 439 
The trial court in Wilson v. Burrows held that this was 
insufficient to pass ownership to the purchaser. But the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed holding that: 
It is Wilsons1 contention here that the Utah 
Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act controlled the 
sale of the cattle to Burrows, and that the making 
of a contract in violation of its provisions was 
void. The purpose of the statute was aimed at the 
theft of livestock within the State and to impede 
the sale of stolen animals. It would not appear 
- 5 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the Legislature intended the statute to 
apply to sales such as we have here between 
the Wilsons and Burrows. In any event, the 
Wilsons cannot now claim that their contracts 
entered into with Burrows were not made in good 
faith. We must conclude that the contracts 
were not void. 27 Utah 2d at 439-440 (emphasis 
added) 
In the instant case, the bill of sale from Witherspoon 
to Deseret Distributing which the Court held to be void for 
failure to comply with the statute (Plaintiff's Exh. 1, pg. 1) 
contained the following information: 
1 The date 
2. The name and address (city only) of the seller 
3. The telephone number of seller 
4. The name and address (city only) of the buyer's agent 
5. The name of the buyer 
6. The number and sex of the cattle 
7. The description and location of the brand 
8. The number of the brand certificate registered to 
seller 
9. That statement that seller sells the cattle giving 
full rights of ownership and possession 
10. Signatures of buyer's agent and seller 
The only requirement of Section 4-13-17 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) not expressed in this bill of sale is the 
place of purchase. The statute does not specify whether this 
is to be where the transaction takes place or where the cattle 
are located. 
In finding Witherspoon's bill of sale void, the trial 
court relied upon Pugh v. Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P. 2d 
463 (1969). That case is not in point, however, inasmuch as 
the purchaser therein did not obtain a written bill of sale. 
In holding that transfer invalid the Supreme Court held: 
- 6 -
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The import of the entire act compels one to 
conclude that Woodard's possession was unlawful 
from the time of delivery since he did not 
receive a written bill of sale. 22 Utah 2d at 194 
The lack of a written bill of sale in Pugh renders 
that case useless as precedent in the instant case, but the 
Witherspoon's transfer was clearly valid under the Wilson v. 
Burrows case, (supra page 5) 
This Court should not allow a seller by technical omis-
sions or deficiencies in the bill of sale given by him to profit 
as against innocent third parties. To uphold the trial court's 
ruling would encourage sellers to give bills of sales which 
would be technically deficient in some manner in order to pre-
serve a right to revoke the transaction. This was not the 
purpose of the Anti-Theft Act and would render a substantial 
injustice in the instant case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE BILL OF SALE 
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT STEWART WAS 
DEFECTIVE DOES NOT BAR DISCOVERY BY STEWART. 
The bill of sale received by Stewart (Defendant's Exhibit 
6) substantially complies with the requirements of the statute, 
and in any event it comes closer to compliance than the bill 
of sale held valid in Wilson v. Burrows, 27 Utah 2d 436, 497 
P. 2d 240 (1972). 
The conclusions of law made by the trial court with 
respect to this bill of sale do not justify a ruling rendering 
- 7 -
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the bill of sale received by Stewart void. 
a. The actual delivery of the animals was not accom-
panied by a written bill of sale. (R. 96) 
This requirement of the statute does not provide that 
a bill of sale may not be given in advance of actual delivery 
and, in fact, this Appellant contends that giving a bill of 
sale in advance of delivery actually exceeds the statutory 
requirement. The use of the word "delivery" implies that the 
livestock in question will be "delivered to" the purchaser. 
In such case it would be reasonable to give a bill of sale at 
that time. If the animals are to be picked up by the purchaser, 
however, it would be reasonable that he have a bill of sale in 
his possession at the time he arrives at the location of the 
cattle. This is in fact what happened. 
b. The bill of sale did not indicate a place of purchase. 
(R. 96) 
It is unclear whether this means the place where the 
money transfers hands or, where the cattle are located, or 
where they are to be delivered to. In any event, it seems that 
the purpose of this statutory requirement is to provide some 
identification as to which livestock are being sold. This 
issue was not raised in the instant case and has no application 
herein. 
c. The bill of sale did not contain the signature and 
address of the buyer and seller. (R. 96) 
- 8 - •• 
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Stewart's seller did in fact sign his bill of sale 
(Def.'s Exh. 6), although Stewart did not. This requirement 
is clearly for the benefit of Stewart and his seller. Neither 
Stewart nor his seller (who is not a party hereto) raises the 
issue, and therefore, Witherspoon has no standing to complain. 
d. Since the brand belonged to Gary J. Witherspoon and 
was recorded in his name, the seller was obligated to provide 
proof of ownership from whom the cattle were purchased, and 
the length of time held in his possession. (R. 96) 
This appears to be a more important requirement, but one 
which was met in the instant case. Stewart saw the two prior 
bills of sale showing a chain of title from Witherspoon. 
Witherspoon1s deed showed that the brand belonged to him and 
substantiated the fact by setting forth the certificate number 
of the brand. Moreover, the time of possession can be also 
traced. Witherspoon's February 18, 1974, bill of sale (Page 1 
of Plaintiff's Exh. 1) gives ownership and Deseret possession; 
Deseret's bill of sale to American is dated the 19th and Ameri-
can's to Stewart is dated the 20th. Witherspoon obtains no 
right arising out of any deficiency in Stewart's bill of sale 
and such deficiencies do not mandatorily prevent title from 
passing. 
If Witherspoon's transfer as per page 1 of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 (the bill of sale to him from Deseret Distributing) 
was sufficient to convey title, Stewart was entitled to pos-
session of the animals as opposed to Witherspoon for the further 
- 9 -
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reason that although named in the Complaint, Witherspoon 
never made Deseret Distributing a party to the action. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NO BRAND 
INSPECTION CERTIFICATE WAS OBTAINED DOES 
NOT VOID AN OTHERWISE VALID TRANSFER. 
Stewart concedes that no brand inspection certificate 
was obtained pursuant to Section 4-13-17.5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). This statute is as follows: 
All changes of ownership through private sale 
or transactions, or at public auctions or commission 
houses, shall be accompanied by a brand inspection 
certificate. 
This statute does not require automatic invalidation of 
all transfers made without a certificate. In light of the 
facts of this case, no protection to either party would have 
been afforded by compliance with this requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Witherspoon seeks to have the transaction declared void, 
while retaining the $1500.00 paid to him as earnest money (the 
remaining checks in the amount of $12,265.00 did not clear the 
bank) on the ground that the bill of sale he drafted was insuf-
ficient. This position is taken at the expense of Stewart who 
had nothing to do with the preparation of Witherspoon's bill 
of sale, who paid the market price for said animals of $8500.00, 
all of which under the trial court's ruling he loses to Wither-
sppon due to Witherspoon*s own error. 
The judgment entered below holding Witherspoon1s transfer 
- 10 -
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void is based completely upon Pugh v. Stratton (R. 72) . 
In contrast to the instant case, however, that case did not 
involve a written bill of sale. Moreover, as explained in 
Wilson v. Burrows by the Utah Supreme Court, Utah law does 
not automatically void a bill of sale which does not conform 
to all the technical requirements of the Utah Livestock Brand 
and Anti-Theft Act, 
The judgment below should be reversed and judgment 
entered for $8500.00 in favor of Defendant-Appellant Stewart. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter T. Stewart, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Richard Richards, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 670 28th Street, Ogden, Utah, 
84403, this day of January, 1976. 
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